Author: Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan, Sinologist – Diplomat – Advisor - Consultant,Founding Chair, Global Silk Route research Alliance.(E-mail: awanzamir@yahoo.com). 

When Iran and the United States signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding in June, people across the Middle East hoped that a destructive war was finally moving toward diplomacy. Pakistan, supported by Qatar, had helped create an opportunity that few believed possible: an agreed framework for ending hostilities, reopening maritime trade and negotiating a permanent settlement.

The memorandum was not merely a declaration of good intentions. Its first clause called for the immediate and permanent termination of military operations. It required both countries to respect each other’s sovereignty and negotiate a final agreement within 60 days. Washington also undertook to remove its naval blockade, permit Iranian oil exports, release frozen Iranian assets, avoid new sanctions and refrain from deploying additional forces while negotiations continued.

Yet several subsequent American decisions directly contradicted those written commitments. Washington revoked an oil-export waiver included in the agreement, restored its blockade of Iranian ports and resumed large-scale attacks. President Donald Trump publicly declared the understanding “over”, while American operations expanded from coastal military positions to bridges, power stations and targets far beyond the Strait of Hormuz.

These were not minor disagreements over interpretation. Restoring a blockade that the United States had promised to remove, withdrawing an agreed oil waiver and returning to military force represented substantive departures from the memorandum.

However, intellectual honesty requires acknowledging the full record. An Iranian drone struck a commercial vessel on June 25, and Iran subsequently attacked other ships using a route overseen by the United States. Tehran argued that this alternative route challenged the maritime arrangements recognised in the memorandum, while Washington maintained that the strait must remain freely accessible. Later Iranian attacks also damaged infrastructure in Gulf states, including a desalination facility in Kuwait.

It is therefore difficult to prove that Iran committed no violation whatsoever. What can be established is that the memorandum contained a monitoring mechanism and a requirement for continued negotiations. Washington chose instead to revoke agreed economic measures, restore coercive action and declare the ceasefire finished. Even where Iran’s conduct required investigation, the proper response was mediation and verification—not the unilateral abandonment of the entire framework.

The human consequences are mounting. By July 18, 16 American service members had reportedly died during the wider conflict. Iran said that at least 50 people had been killed and more than 500 injured during the latest period of American strikes, although wartime casualty figures remain difficult to verify independently. Earlier in the conflict, the World Health Organization reported nearly 1,000 deaths and 7,000 injuries across the region and verified 13 attacks on health care in Iran.

Hospitals, patients, medical workers, water systems and electricity networks must never become instruments of pressure. Damage to a power station does not remain confined to one military objective: it can stop hospital equipment, water pumps, sewage treatment, food refrigeration and emergency communications. Attacks on such interconnected systems inevitably transfer the cost of war to civilians.

Nor is this conflict limited to Iran and the United States. The Strait of Hormuz normally carries about one-fifth of globally traded oil and gas. Renewed hostilities pushed Brent crude to approximately $84.73 a barrel in mid-July, while shipping interruptions increased inflationary pressure throughout the world. Asian economies are particularly exposed because they receive most Gulf energy exports passing through the strait.

The effects extend far beyond petrol prices. Earlier wartime disruption cut off an estimated 17 per cent of global natural-gas supply and more than 30 per cent of nitrogen-fertilizer supply, while trapping almost half of exported Sulphur in the Gulf. Fertilizer shortages threaten harvests and food prices, especially in developing countries. Disruption to petrochemical trade has also driven up the price of plastics and industrial materials used in vehicles, packaging, medical equipment, construction and consumer goods.

The American public itself is increasingly unconvinced. A July Economist/YouGov survey found that 57 per cent of Americans considered the decision to go to war wrong, while 65 per cent wanted Washington to reach an agreement as soon as possible. Another Ipsos survey found that 79 per cent expected American military involvement to continue for an extended period.

These figures suggest that the fear of an open-ended war is not confined to Iran or the Arab world. Americans also understand that their soldiers, taxpayers and household budgets will bear the consequences.

The immediate requirement is a reciprocal ceasefire covering air, missile, drone, naval and proxy attacks. Pakistan and Qatar should urgently reconvene the implementation committee established under the Islamabad MoU. The United States should suspend the restored blockade and sanctions measures introduced after the agreement, while Iran should guarantee safe passage for commercial shipping and halt attacks affecting neighbouring countries.

A jointly supervised mechanism should investigate alleged violations, and hospitals, nuclear installations, desalination plants, power stations, ports and other essential civilian facilities should be placed on a formal no-strike list. The United Nations Security Council should endorse the revived process and establish independent monitoring of civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.

Claims that one side can occupy the Strait of Hormuz, seize Iranian islands or obtain lasting security through unlimited bombing are dangerously unrealistic. Such actions would require a much larger military commitment and could turn an already grave confrontation into a prolonged regional war.

The Islamabad MoU offered a road away from catastrophe. Its collapse was not inevitable. The written framework still exists, as do the mediators, monitoring provisions and negotiating channels.

Washington and Tehran must return to them before another strike closes the remaining space for diplomacy. Peace-loving governments should not merely express concern. They must jointly demand an immediate ceasefire, restoration of the Islamabad framework and a negotiated settlement before this war imposes an even heavier price on the entire world.

(ASIA PACIFIC DAILY）