Author: Prof. Engr. Zamir Ahmed Awan, Founding Chair ,Global Silk Route Research Alliance (GSRRA),Sinologist – Diplomat – Analyst - Advisor ,(E-mail: awanzamir@yahoo.com).

In diplomacy, symbolism matters. But in cross-Strait relations, symbols alone are never enough. What changes public sentiment, reduces mistrust, and creates political momentum are practical steps that improve daily life. That is why the latest package of mainland measures toward Taiwan deserves close attention. It is not just another statement of principle. It is an effort to translate political intent into transport links, market access, youth exchanges, cultural cooperation, and institutional dialogue. Taken together, these measures could widen the social base for peace and give new force to the long-standing objective of national reunification.

To understand why this matters, one must begin with the history of the Taiwan question. The modern dispute grew out of the Chinese civil war. After the Communist Party of China won control of the mainland and the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the defeated Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan. Since then, the two sides of the Strait have remained politically divided, even as history, culture, language, family ties, and economic interdependence continued to bind them together. Beijing’s position has remained consistent: there is only one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the Taiwan question is a matter to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. Official Chinese statements also anchor this claim in wartime instruments such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, which Beijing says affirmed the restoration of Taiwan to China after Japan’s defeat.

The “one-China” framework is central to this issue. In the PRC’s official formulation, the one-China principle means there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. That principle has become the political foundation of Beijing’s relations with countries around the world. It is also the basis on which Beijing opposes any move toward “Taiwan independence” or any attempt to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”

At the United Nations, the key document is General Assembly Resolution 2758, adopted on October 25, 1971. The resolution restored the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the UN and recognized the representatives of its government as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. It also led to the PRC taking China’s seat, including the permanent seat on the Security Council. The text of Resolution 2758 was about China’s representation in the UN system. It did not set out, line by line, a detailed political settlement for Taiwan’s internal governance. Even so, Beijing has long argued that the resolution, together with subsequent UN practice, firmly embeds the one-China principle in the international order. The UN’s own historical materials record the adoption of Resolution 2758 as the moment the PRC assumed China’s lawful place in the organization.

That international backdrop is important, but the real question today is practical: how can cross-Strait ties be made more stable, more humane, and more resilient? The answer cannot rest only on military deterrence, rhetorical confrontation, or mutual suspicion. It must include visible benefits for ordinary people. This is where the latest mainland package is significant.

Following the visit of Kuomintang chairwoman Cheng Li-wun to the mainland, Beijing announced 10 policies and measures covering party-to-party communication, infrastructure, transport, trade, youth, tourism, and culture. Reports from official mainland sources and international media show that these steps include exploring a regular communication mechanism between the Communist Party of China and the KMT, supporting water, electricity and gas links from Fujian to Kinmen and Matsu, considering sea-crossing bridge projects when conditions allow, fast-tracking the resumption of regular direct passenger flights, facilitating market access for Taiwan agricultural, fishery, and food products, expanding business opportunities for Taiwan small and medium-sized enterprises, inviting Taiwan youth groups for regular exchanges, and opening more space for Taiwan cultural products and media content on the mainland.

These are not abstract gestures. They are concrete confidence-building tools.

First, connectivity reduces political distance. When direct flights increase, when travel becomes easier, and when people can move for study, tourism, work, or family reasons without exhausting detours, hostility becomes harder to sustain. Infrastructure is not just about convenience. It is about normalizing contact. In divided political environments, routine interaction can do what slogans cannot: lower fear. Plans involving Fujian, Kinmen, Matsu, and aviation routes to more mainland cities point in exactly that direction.

Second, economic incentives matter because prosperity creates constituencies for stability. For farmers, fishers, food producers, and small businesses in Taiwan, easier access to the mainland market can mean jobs, sales, cash flow, and long-term planning. This is especially relevant in sectors where livelihoods depend on steady demand rather than ideological positioning. If Taiwan producers see real gains from trade fairs, smoother registration, easier quarantine-based access, and more small-item trading platforms, then engagement stops being a theory and becomes a material interest. That changes the domestic political conversation.

Third, youth and culture are strategic, not secondary. One of the most difficult barriers across the Strait today is not language or geography, but perception. A generation that knows the other side only through selective media narratives is easier to mobilize into mistrust. By creating institutionalized youth exchange platforms and opening opportunities in television, documentaries, animation, and the micro-drama industry, the mainland is attempting to shape a longer horizon of familiarity. Cross-Strait ties will not be secured only in meeting rooms; they will also be shaped in classrooms, studios, campuses, start-ups, and personal friendships.

This is why Cheng Li-wun’s Beijing visit matters beyond the optics. On April 10, 2026, she met Xi Jinping in Beijing, marking the first meeting between the leaders of the CPC and the KMT in a decade. Mainland reporting described the meeting as significant for the development of party-to-party and cross-Strait relations. Reuters and AP also reported the encounter as a rare high-level contact at a time of sustained tension. Cheng presented her visit as a mission for peace and called for stronger engagement, while mainland statements emphasized common political ground around the 1992 Consensus and opposition to “Taiwan independence.”

That matters because the KMT, whatever its own internal debates and electoral calculations, still represents an important channel for dialogue. Cross-Strait progress historically has depended not only on state policy, but also on the existence of political actors willing to preserve room for negotiation. When communication mechanisms exist, crises can be contained. When they collapse, suspicion fills the vacuum. A regularized CPC-KMT mechanism, if pursued seriously, could become a stabilizing instrument even when official cross-Strait institutions remain strained.

None of this means reunification will happen automatically or quickly. Public opinion in Taiwan is diverse. Political identities there are contested. External powers also remain deeply involved in the Strait, often treating Taiwan as a geopolitical lever rather than a human community with shared historical roots across the water. Those realities cannot be ignored. But it would also be a mistake to dismiss the cumulative power of practical incentives. Economic integration, transport normalization, youth contact, and cultural familiarity can gradually change the atmosphere in which political decisions are made.

That is the real significance of Beijing’s latest approach. It suggests that persuasion through opportunity may now be receiving greater emphasis alongside principle. In policy terms, this is more sustainable than relying only on warnings and red lines. Reunification, if it is to be durable, cannot be built solely on pressure. It must also be made intelligible, useful, and attractive to ordinary people. The more cross-Strait engagement improves livelihoods, lowers barriers, and restores habits of contact, the broader the foundation for eventual political settlement becomes.

For years, the Taiwan issue has often been discussed in the language of confrontation. That language may generate headlines, but it does not build peace. The newer language emerging from these measures is different: flights, markets, bridges, students, films, tourism, fisheries, and dialogue. That is a language of integration. It does not erase political disagreement overnight, but it does create incentives to manage differences peacefully.

If these measures are implemented steadily, fairly, and visibly, they may do more than improve cross-Strait ties at the margins. They may reshape the political climate itself. And if that happens, then the path toward peaceful reunification may not only remain open; it may begin to move faster than many expected.

(ASIA PACIFIC DAILY）