Pyongyang and Washington draw their negotiating cards

Editor's note:Tom Fowdy graduated with an Msc. in Chinese Studies from Oxford University after previously majoring in Politics at Durham University. He has published a number of pieces on the international relations of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article reflects the author's views, and not necessarily those of APD.

Less than a week after the summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and DPRK leader Kim Jong Un fell flat on a “No Deal” outcome, developments painting a much less picture are starting to emerge. On the evening of March 5, satellite imagery observed that Pyongyang had begun reassembling parts of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, a facility which had been partially dismantled as a gesture of goodwill to Washington the previous year. The development sounded out alarm bells in the American capital, raising speculation that the DPRK were about to recommence with the development of intercontinental ballistic missile technology.

But the developments didn't end there. In a recent interview to the press, United States National Security advisor John Bolton also struck a tone against Pyongyang which had not been heard since before June 2018, that is, talk of strengthening U.S sanctions against the country. Although Bolton stated openly that the president is looking to make a deal and would even be interested in a third summit, he warned that if Kim was not serious about denuclearization, then the U.S would “look into ramping up sanctions” against the country.

The Sohae Satellite Launching Station launch pad features what researchers of Beyond Parallel, a CSIS project, describe as showing the partially rebuilt rail-mounted rocket transfer structure in a commercial satellite image taken over Tongchang-ri, DPRK‍, March 2, 2019, and released March 5, 2019. /VCG Photo

Of course, the surprise emergence of both events was less than pleasing to most analysts. But what is really going on here? Journalists will spin these happenings as a prelude to the return of confrontation, alluding towards fears that Pyongyang might resume testing and that Washington will resume a campaign of maximum pressure. While of course, both today's developments are not welcome news, what is really going on here is that both sides are now drawing their negotiating cards.

On the back of last week's outcome, both countries want a deal, but neither is ultimately happy with the demands of the other. As a result, what is visible here is posturing by both sides in order to sharpen their leverage. However, the dangers continue to lark in the fact that in the backdrop of making a deal, neither wants to be seen as capitulating to the other.

The reassembling of the Sohae site is a subtle show of disapproval against Washington. It comes on the back of comments from Pyongyang that their offer presented at Hanoi is final and that they are not afraid to return to “the old way” if things break down. A satellite launch facility is the most indirect, yet meaningful way of physically demonstrating that. The fact it is associated with the DPRK's space program means it is not a direct commitment to developing nuclear and missile technology. This allows Pyongyang to claim it is non-provocative. Some countries, however, note that the space program is a subtle way of developing missile technology without resorting to explicit confrontation. In essence, it is an indirect, but not overbearing warning.

For the United States, the fact that John Bolton is now taking a larger role on the subject of the DPRK is also a veiled warning from the Trump administration. For most of these talks since last year, he has been marginalized with his influence focused elsewhere. However, if Pyongyang is not prepared to make serious concessions to Washington, then he is offered political space to act. There is speculation he had a role in derailing Hanoi. However, we should not overestimate his power. If Trump sees a deal that he believes he can politically win from, he can ignore and dismiss Bolton as he wishes. Bolton's comments themselves affirm that the President is still winning to do so, but if not there is another path.

People ride bicycles with flags of the DPRK, Vietnam and the U.S. outside the Sofitel Legend Metropole Hanoi hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 27, 2019. /VCG Photo

As a result, these responses demonstrate how both countries are now slowly starting to toy with their leverage as they look to pick up on talks from this point.

In making these gestures, they are not looking to scupper talks or renew hostility, but are making their negotiating positions known and serious. Each wants the other to respect their terms. This exposes the problem that has plagued talks since the beginning: the notion that both sides want a deal which is politically beneficial to themselves and does not “capitulate” or give too much to the other. Washington wants to get rid of as much of Pyongyang's nuclear capability as possible, but Pyongyang simultaneously wants to keep as much of it as possible. Attempts to compromise on this and meet in the middle so far have proved politically problematic.

Will, in this case, a return to posturing and indirect threats make a difference? It will certainly serve to remind both parties in this case what lies in store if they do not act pragmatically.

The DPRK does not want more sanctions, but neither does the U.S want a DPRK with even more missile capability than before. Negotiations are going to continue, but they are going to become tense.

At this stage, it cannot be predicted as to whether they will succeed or fail. Fear of the worst could easily push a deal over the line, or persistent political stubbornness and demands for unilateral capitulation could easily open a pathway to confrontation. Either way, both Pyongyang and Washington have drawn their negotiating cards. It's now time now to put them on the table.

(CGTN)